Systems and methods for allocating and pricing alternative network access resources with reserve prices

ABSTRACT

A method for allocating and pricing access to alternative access networks may include: inputting, by one or more parties, needs for alternative network access and representative values for satisfying the needs; setting, by providers of alternative network access, reserve prices for access to each of access point in the alternative network; generating a solution based on a mixed integer program to maximize value created by allocation of alternative network access; and allocating alternative network access to the one or more parties based on the mixed integer program solution.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.14/587,662, filed on Dec. 31, 2014, which claims the benefit of U.S.Provisional Patent App. No. 61/922,396, filed on Dec. 31, 2013, U.S.Provisional Patent App. No. 61/922,382, filed on Dec. 31, 2013, and U.S.Provisional Patent App. No. 61/922,376, filed on Dec. 31, 2013, thedisclosures of all of which are hereby incorporated herein by referenceas if set forth in their entireties.

BACKGROUND

Field

The subject matter discussed herein relates generally to wirelessservice to mobile devices and, more particularly, to allocation ofresources on alternative radio access networks that can be used toservice mobile devices in situations in which the alternative networkaccess providers wish to set minimum acceptable prices for networkaccess.

Introduction

Mobile devices generally rely on wireless service provided by a serviceprovider using cellular communications that utilize radio frequencycommunication.

Data communications to mobile devices can also be provided over othertypes of radio access networks. For example, Wi-Fi access pointsconnected to broadband networks provide data to mobile devices. Thechoice of whether data communication takes place over a cellular networkor a Wi-Fi connection is normally left to the end user of the device. Ifthe end user has entered all necessary passwords and access credentialsto the mobile device memory and the Wi-Fi radio is on, in many cases theconnection to Wi-Fi is preferred automatically by the mobile device.

In U.S. patent application Ser. Nos. 13/684,044 (filed Nov. 21, 2012),13/684,048 (filed Nov. 21, 2012), 13/684,049 (filed Nov. 21, 2012),61/805,473 (filed Mar. 26, 2012), 61/805,476 (filed Mar. 26, 2012) and61/877,178 (filed Sep. 12, 2013) methods are described for alternativenetwork access (ANA) based on methods and systems for selecting theradio access network to provide Internet or other network access basedon terms and conditions for allowing access and terms and conditions forutilizing access to the alternative network. Each of those applicationsis hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

In practice, the terms and conditions for utilizing access toalternative networks often depend on the expected or the actual load onthe primary network managed by the service provider for the device. Forexample, if the primary network access takes place through the cellularnetwork system owned by the service provider for the device, it islikely that the service provider first wants to utilize all of thecapacity in its own network before seeking to use capacity from analternative network. This is especially the case if there is a costassociated with using the alternative network access.

In provisional Patent application titled SYSTEMS AND METHODS FORMANAGING OFFLOAD FROM ONE RADIO ACCESS NETWORK TO ANOTHER filedconcurrently herewith, systems and methods are described to manageoffload of traffic to a system of alternative network access pointsbased on and offload profile established by mutual agreement between theprimary mobile network operator and the provider of alternative networkaccess. That application is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety.

In provisional Patent application titled SYSTEMS AND METHODS FORALLOCATING ALTERNATIVE NETWORK ACCESS RESOURCES filed concurrentlyherewith, a method is described to allocate access to access points foralternative network access when several mobile operators and alternativeaccess providers are involved. That application is incorporated hereinby reference in its entirety.

This application describes a methodology for utilizing reserve pricesfor allocating and pricing access to resources represented by the accesspoints of the alternative network access provider or several providersin a situation where one or more mobile network operators and zero ormore other parties interested in access to the same resources throughthe same access management system and the alternative network accessproviders wish to set a minimum price for their resources.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Aspects and features of the present inventive concept will be moreapparent by describing example embodiments with reference to theaccompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a cellular network and analternative access network according to various embodiments; and

FIG. 2 is a graph illustrating a typical variation of data usage duringthe hours of a business day in a downtown business district and anexample of such peak demand exceeding the cellular network capacity; and

FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method according to variousembodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The subject matter described herein is taught by way of exampleimplementations. Various details have been omitted for the sake ofclarity and to avoid obscuring the subject matter. The examples shownbelow are directed to structures and functions for implementing systemsand methods for establishing wireless connections based on accessconditions. Other features and advantages of the subject matter shouldbe apparent from the following description.

As communication needs of various wireless and mobile devices havegrown, many of them have been equipped with more than one radio system.Each of the radio systems may be used to connect to one or more wirelessnetworks based on the system protocols. Examples of such systems are acellular radio system that may be utilizing a GSM, CDMA or the LTEstandard for encoding the signal and a Wi-Fi system that utilizes awell-known IEEE 802.11 standard for communication. Another example wouldbe a WiMAX system that is based on the IEEE standard 802.16.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram 100 illustrating a cellular network and analternative access network according to various embodiments. Referringto FIG. 1, a mobile device 110 may communicate with a cellular network120. The mobile device 110 may also be configured to communicate with analternative access network 140 through an access point 130.

In a communication device that has multiple radio systems each of theradios may have different characteristics. For example, the cellularsystem may be designed to connect to cell towers that are further apartand use a higher power signal than the Wi-Fi radio system uses. Sincethe Wi-Fi standard is utilizing unlicensed spectrum, the power of thetransmitter may be limited by regulation and consequently the distanceover which the communication can effectively take place in is typicallyshorter than the distance in the case of a cellular connection.

The different characteristic of the radio systems result in a topologyof coverage in the environment that is very different for each radioaccess network. For example, in the cellular system a single radio maybe covering an area ranging from hundreds of meters across to a fewkilometers, with typically one square kilometer or more of surface areafor a cellular sector. In comparison, a Wi-Fi system that is based onusing unlicensed radio bands and therefore limited in the power of thesignal, typically only covers an area of 50 meters to 100 meters across.

The end result of the relatively high penetration of broadband access,high prevalence of Wi-Fi access points as the termination points onbroadband connections and the sparse and intermittent use of theseInternet connections is that there is tremendous unused wireless networkaccess capacity available in most urban and suburban areas. Thiscapacity is owned and controlled by broadband service providers. In mostcases these are different companies than the mobile network operators.Therefore in most cases the access points are not available foralternative network access to the mobile devices that primarily usecellular networks for accessing the Internet.

As the overall usage of data by mobile devices continues to grow, moredevices, connected to a particular cell sector radio will attempt to usemore data at higher frequencies. Over time this means that the maximumcapacity of data traffic at the cellular radio will be reached.Initially this typically happens only during peak usage times. Thesepeak times are typically very regular and occur during business daysduring the same hours every day. The actual pattern of usage may bedifferent at different locations. For example, in downtown businessdistricts the peak usage takes place during the morning and eveningcommute hours and during lunchtime. In suburban residential areas thehighest usage normally occurs during the evening hours. FIG. 2 is agraph illustrating a typical variation of data usage during the hours ofa business day in a downtown business district and an example of suchpeak demand exceeding the cellular network capacity.

Since the mobile network operators occasionally in some locations needadditional capacity and broadband network operators with Wi-Fi access tothe network often have capacity that is not being used, it makes sensefor the broadband network operators to become providers of alternativenetwork access to the mobile network operators. However, allocating theresources of these alternative network access points to possibly severalmobile network operators that may wish to use them at the same time isnot a trivial problem.

A method of using mixed integer programming to allocate access based onvalues provided by the buyers of access, mobile network operators(MNOs), mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and other partiesinterested in access to the alternative networks was explained in patentapplication titled SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR ALLOCATING ALTERNATIVENETWORK ACCESS RESOURCES. The basic assumption in that method was thataccess to the alternative network access points was available regardlessof what the values stated by the MNOs and other parties interested inthe access were.

This application provides the solution for how to allocate the access(in the form of reservations) in case the various alternative accessproviders have established minimum prices for getting access to otherresources, and how to compute prices for these reservations.

In the following the minimum price for capacity from a particular accesspoint is called the reserve price. The reserve price can either be setindividually for each access point and can be dependent on the time, ora seller can specify one “averaged” reserve price that needs to be meton average, but not at every access point at in each time slot. In thefollowing example the allocation is done once a day for one hour timeslots during a day. Obviously the same mechanism applies for any otherfrequency for allocating capacity and any other time resolution.

Reservation Mechanism Using Reserve Prices

In order to understand the constrains and allocation mechanism thefollowing are the indices used in the equations that express theconstraints:

-   -   Sets and Indices:    -   i ε I, indexing MNOs, and i ε I′, indexing MVNOs    -   j ε J, indexing the sectors (individually per MNO/MVNO)    -   s ε S, indexing sellers    -   α ε A, indexing APs    -   k ε K={0,1, . . . 23 }, time slots in a day

The following are the parameters and their units:

-   -   Parameters [Units]:    -   D_(ijk)[Mbits/s], offloading demand from MNO/MVNO i in sector j        for slot k;

${D_{ij} = {\sum\limits_{k \in K}{D_{ijk}{S_{ak}\left\lbrack {{Mbits}\text{/}s} \right\rbrack}}}},$(predicted)supply available at access point α in time slot k

${T_{ijak}\left\lbrack \frac{Mbits}{s} \right\rbrack},$(Predicted) traffic from MNO/MVNO i in j “around” a in timeslot k(offloading potential)

-   -   F_(ijk)[Mbits/s], capacity downwards tolerance (“fudge factor)”        by MNO i in its sector j in time slot k    -   V_(ij)[$], value of MNO i for sector j for offloading all of its        demand during the whole day in this sector    -   V_(i)′[$/GB], value of MVNO i for offloading 1 GB (in any sector        at any time)    -   R_(αk)[$/Mbits], reserve price from access point a for time slot        k    -   R_(s)[$/Mbits], “average” reserve price from seller s for all of        its APs and all time slots    -   B_(ijαk) ^(T)ε[0,1], volatility buffer to “discount” the traffic        from i in sector j in timeslot karound AP a    -   B_(αk) ^(S)ε[0,1], volatility buffer to “discount” the supply        from access point a in timeslot turn italic    -   Cε[0,1], commission (multiplied with clearing price, e.g.,        C=0.1)    -   L[seconds], length of one time slot (e.g., 3,600 seconds=1 hour)

The variables in the system and their units are:

-   -   Variables [Units]    -   x_(ij)ε{0,1}, does MNO i get reservation for sector j or not        (modeling the combinatorial preferences)    -   y_(ijk)[Mbits/s], traffic reservation for MNO/MVNO i for sector        j in time slot k    -   r_(ijαk)[Mbits/s], traffic reservation at access point a for        MNO/MVNO is sector j in time slot k    -   r_(ijαk)[Mbits/s], traffic reservation for MNO/MVNO i's sector j        in time slot k at all of seller s's APs

The mixed integer programming MIP expression to be maximized is:

$\begin{matrix}{{\max\limits_{x,y,r}\underset{\underset{{value}\mspace{14mu}{created}\mspace{11mu}{from}\mspace{11mu}{MNOs}}{︸}}{\sum\limits_{i \in I}{\sum\limits_{j \in J}{V_{ij} \cdot \frac{\sum\limits_{k \in K}y_{ijk}}{D_{ij}} \cdot}}}} + \underset{\underset{{value}\mspace{14mu}{created}\mspace{11mu}{from}\mspace{11mu}{MVNOs}}{︸}}{\sum\limits_{i \in I^{\prime}}{\sum\limits_{j \in J}{\sum\limits_{k \in K}{V_{i}^{\prime} \cdot \frac{y_{ijk} \cdot L}{{8 \cdot 1},000} \cdot}}}}} & \left( {{MIP}\mspace{14mu} 1} \right)\end{matrix}$

The associated constraints are:y_(ijk)≦x_(ij)·D_(ijk) ∀ i ε I, j ε J, k ε K [only reserve sth, ifallocated, and never more than demand]  (2)y_(ijk)≧x_(ij)·(D_(ijk)−F_(ijk)) ∀ i ε I, j ε J, k ε K [if allocated,then don't reserve too little]  (3)y_(ijk)=Σ_(α)r_(ijαk) ∀ i ε I U I′, j ε J, k ε K [reserve as much asneeded to satisfy demand]  (4)r_(ijαk)≦T_(ijαk)·B_(ijαk) ^(T) ∀ i ε I U I′,j, k, α [don't reserve morethan available traffic around AP]  (5)Σ_(i,j)r_(ijαk)≦S_(αk)·B_(αk) ^(S) ∀ α ε A, k ε K [don't reserve more atan AP than available supply]  (6)

$\begin{matrix}{{{V_{ij} \cdot \frac{\sum\limits_{k \in K}y_{ijk}}{D_{ij}}} \geq {\sum\limits_{a \in A}{\sum\limits_{k \in K}{{\frac{R_{ak}}{\left( {1 - C} \right)} \cdot \frac{r_{ijak} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}}\mspace{14mu}{\forall{i \in I}}}}}},{j \in {J\mspace{14mu}\left\lbrack {{MNOs}\text{:}\mspace{14mu}{handle}\mspace{14mu}\text{per-AP-per-k reserves}} \right\rbrack}}} & (7)\end{matrix}$

$\begin{matrix}{{{V_{i}^{\prime} \cdot \frac{y_{ijk} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}} \geq {\sum\limits_{a \in A}{{\frac{R_{ak}}{\left( {1 - C} \right)} \cdot \frac{r_{ijak} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}}\mspace{14mu}{\forall{i \in I^{\prime}}}}}},{j \in J},{k \in {K\mspace{14mu}\left\lbrack {{MVNOs}\text{:}\mspace{14mu}{handle}\mspace{14mu}\text{per-AP-per-k reserves}} \right\rbrack}}} & (8)\end{matrix}$

$\begin{matrix}{{{V_{ij} \cdot \frac{\sum\limits_{k \in K}y_{ijk}}{D_{ij}}} \geq {\sum\limits_{s \in S}{\frac{R_{s}}{\left( {1 - C} \right)} \cdot {\sum\limits_{k \in K}{\frac{r_{ijsk} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}\mspace{14mu}{\forall{i \in I}}}}}}},{j \in {J\mspace{14mu}\left\lbrack {{MNO}\text{:}\mspace{14mu}{handle}\mspace{14mu}\text{average reserve prices}} \right\rbrack}}} & (9)\end{matrix}$

$\begin{matrix}{{{V_{i}^{\prime} \cdot \frac{y_{ijk} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}} \geq {\sum\limits_{s \in S}{{\frac{R_{ak}}{\left( {1 - C} \right)} \cdot \frac{r_{ijsk} \cdot L}{8 \cdot 1000}}\mspace{14mu}{\forall{i \in I^{\prime}}}}}},{j \in J},{k \in {K\mspace{14mu}\left\lbrack {{MVNOs}\text{:}\mspace{14mu}{handle}\mspace{14mu}{average}\mspace{14mu}{reserves}} \right\rbrack}}} & (10)\end{matrix}$r_(ijsk)=Σ_(αεA(s))r_(ijαk) ∀ i ε I U I′,j ε J, s ε S, k ε K [set thereservation variables consistently]  (11)

The objective function: we maximize efficiency (i.e., social welfare),i.e., we maximize the total value created. Because MNOs and MVNOs reporttheir value functions differently, we should treat them separately. Inthe first term, we sum over all MNOs i and all of their sectors j, andfor each sector, we multiply their reported value V_(ij)(in $) with thefraction of how much of their total demand they actually received (thusassuming a linear value relationship). In the second term, we sum overall MVNOs i, all their sectors j and all time slots k, and then multiplytheir value (in dollars per GB ($/GB)) with how much bandwidth theyactually received (in GB). We multiply by L and divide by 8 and 1,000 toconvert MBit/s into GB. The explanations for the constraints are thefollowing:

Line (2): This and the following constraint handle the combinatorialpreferences for the MNOs. Here, if MNO i does not get a reservation insector j, the x_(ijk)=0, and thus, the amount of traffic reservedy_(ijk) must also be 0. If i gets the reservation in sector j, thenx_(ijk)=1, and then we make sure that we do not reserve more than thedemand, i.e., y_(ijk)≦D_(ijk).

Line (3): This line handles the second part of the combinatorialconstraint. If MNO i gets a reservation for sector j (i.e., x_(ij)=1),then we must reserve enough, i.e., at least its demand minus the maximalallowable capacity deviation, i.e., y_(ijk)≧D_(ijk)−F_(ijk).

Line (4): This constraint balances demand and supply. Every reservationthat we promise some buyer (i.e., y_(ijk)) needs to be satisfied by thereservations made for this buyer at all APs (i.e., Σ_(α)r_(ijαk)).

Line (5): This constraint makes sure we obey the traffic potentialaround the APs. Specifically, for every buyer i and its sector j forevery timeslot k and every AP α, we cannot reserve more than there ispotential traffic to be offloaded. On the right-hand-side, we multiplyT_(ijαk), i.e., the potential traffic to be offloaded, with thevolatility buffer B_(ijαk) ^(T)ε[0,1] to account for the volatility ofthe traffic around the AP. If there is low volatility, then we will havea high value for B_(ijαk) ^(T) close to 1.

Line (6): This constraint makes sure we obey the availability supply ateach AP. More specifically, for each AP α and timeslot k, we make surethat the total amount of reservations for this AP and timeslot (i.e.,Σ_(i,j)r_(ijαk)) is less than or equal to the available supply. To getthe available supply, we multiply (i.e., reduce, the supply parameterS_(αk) with the volatility buffer B_(αk) ^(T)ε[0,1] to account for thevolatility in supply at this AP in timeslot k (particularly importantfor amenity Wi-Fi).

Line (7): The next two constraints handle the per-AccessPoint-per-time-slot reservation prices of the sellers. This specificconstraint handles this for the MNOs.

For each MNO i and each sector j, we make sure that the total valuegenerated (i.e., the expression on the left-and-side) is at least aslarge as necessary to satisfy the reservation prices and the commission(i.e., the expression on the right-hand-side). You can verify that theexpression on the left-hand-side is the same as the value of the MNOs inthe objective of the function (i.e. a term measured in dollars).

On the right-hand-side, we sum over all APs and time slots, and thentake each per-AP-per-time-slot reservation price R_(αk) and divide it by(1−C) to account for the commission. For example, if the reservationprice is $9, and C=0.1, then the resulting term is $10, i.e.,effectively, we have increased the reservation price, because the $10 isthe true minimum clearing price possible, such that we can still take a10% commission and still have enough left to satisfy the seller's truereservation price (of $9). Once we have this “corrected” reservationprice (in $/GB) we multiply it with the total amount of traffic reservedat this AP for this time slot. Because r_(ijαk) is measured in Mbits/s,we multiply it by L=3,600 seconds, and divide by 8 and by 1,000 to getthe total traffic in GB. This, multiplied by the reserve price (in$/GB), gives us a value measured in dollars as on the left-hand-side.

Line (8): This line handles the per-AP-per-time-slot reservation priceconstraint for the MVNOs. Again, the term on the left-hand-side is therealized value of the MVNO, and you can verify that it is the sameexpression as in the second term in the objective function. On theright-hand side, we have the same expression as in the line above,except that we do not sum over all time slots k, but instead we have aseparate constraint individually for each time slot, because MVNOs donot have combinatorial preferences that span multiple time slots.

Line (9): The next two lines handle the “average” reservation prices ofthe sellers, i.e., the reservation prices do not need to hold per AP, orper buyer or per sector, but just on average over all the seller's APs.This line specifically handles this for the MNOs only. Still, thedecision is whether to make a reservation for a buyer i in sector j ornot. Thus, for each i and each j, we check, if the reservation-priceconstraint can be satisfied, i.e., we make sure that the value generatedfor this buyer in this sector is enough to satisfy the reservationprices in the commission (otherwise we cannot make a reservation forthis buyer in this sector).

On the left-hand-side, as before, we simply have the value generated forthe buyer, the same as in the first term in the objective function.

On the right-hand-side, we now sum over all sellers s ε S, and for eachseller, we defied its reservation price R_(s) by (1−C) to account forthe commission, as before. Then we multiply this “corrected” reservationprice with the total amount of bandwidth reserved at an access pointthat belongs to the seller. For this, we introduce the new variabler_(ijsk) which denotes the sum of the reservations for buyer i in sectorj at all access points belonging to seller s. See line (11) where thesevariables are set.

Line (10): This line handles the “average” reservation prices for theMVNOs. As before, the left-hand-side is the value generated for theMVNOs, and it is the same as the second term in the objective function.The right-hand-side is the same as in the line above, except that we donot sum over all time slots k ε K, because the MVNOs do not havecombinatorial constraints that span multiple timeslots. For this reason,we instead have a separate constraint for every timeslot, because it isokay if the constraints only hold individually, per timeslot.

Line (11): In this line we set the new reservation variables r_(ijsk)that capture how much bandwidth we reserve at any of seller s's accesspoints for a buyer i in sector j for time slot k, to be equal to the sumof the per-AP-reservations r_(ijαk). For this, we need to sum over allAPs in the set A(s), i.e., the set of all access points that belong toseller s.

Pricing Mechanism for Short-Term Market

For the short-term market, we also use MIP 1 to compute thereservations. The only difference is that now the MNOs do not havecombinatorial preferences. However, the result of solving MIP 1 is stilla set of reservations.

To price the reservations of the short-term market, we will use the VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism. In particular, we will compute oneprice per buyer per day to be paid to the market operator.

The algorithmic process of computing the VCG prices per buyer involvessolving the MIP 1 once including all buyers, and then again n moretimes, where n corresponds to the number of winning buyers. The paymentof buyer i is then the difference in value accrued to all others buyersin the solution that includes buyer i and their value in the solutionthat does not include buyer i.

We subtract the commission fee from the buyer's VCG payment, and theremaining amount of money is paid to the sellers who owned any of theaccess points via which the buyer offloaded some of its data. The amountof money is split up accordingly to the contribution each seller made(i.e., the amount of traffic from this buyer that went through its APrelative to the total amount of traffic).

Pricing Mechanism for Long-Term Market

To price the reservations that result from solving MIP 1, we usecore-selecting combinatorial auctions with reserve prices. That meansthat we compute one price for each buyer, and the prices lie in theso-called “core” which means that none of the losing bidders would bewilling to pay more for the resources than what the winning bidders arepaying. We will use the VCG payment vector (computed as described above)as the reference price vector in computing core payments, and we willminimize the Euclidian distance to the VCG price vector to determine thefinal payments. Based on the buyers' payments, the commission fee andthe payments to the sellers are calculated in the same way as describedin the short-term market design.

To make the computation of the core payments computationally feasible,we will use a core constraint generation method, which iteratively addsnew core constraints to the price finding algorithm until no more coreconstraints are violated, i.e., until prices are high enough such thatall prices are in the core.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method according to variousembodiments. Referring to FIG. 3, one or more parties may input needsfor alternative network access and representative values for satisfyingthe needs (310). The parties may receive from providers of alternativenetwork access reserve prices for access to each access point in thealternative network (320). A solution based on a mixed integer programmay be generated to maximize value created by allocation of alternativenetwork access (330). Alternative network access may be allocated to theone or more parties based on the mixed integer program solution (340).

The foregoing systems and methods and associated devices and modules aresusceptible to many variations. Additionally, for clarity and concision,many descriptions of the systems and methods have been simplified. Forexample, the figures generally illustrate one of each type of networkdevice, but a network system may have many of each type of device.

As described in this specification, various systems and methods aredescribed as working to optimize particular parameters, functions, oroperations. This use of the term optimize does not necessarily meanoptimize in an abstract theoretical or global sense. Rather, the systemsand methods may work to improve performance using algorithms that areexpected to improve performance in at least many common cases. Forexample, the systems and methods may work to optimize performance judgedby particular functions or criteria. Similar terms like minimize ormaximize are used in a like manner.

Those of skill will appreciate that the various illustrative logicalblocks, modules, units, and algorithm steps described in connection withthe embodiments disclosed herein can often be implemented as electronichardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearlyillustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, variousillustrative components, blocks, modules, and steps have been describedabove generally in terms of their functionality. Whether suchfunctionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon theparticular constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled personscan implement the described functionality in varying ways for eachparticular system, but such implementation decisions should not beinterpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the invention. Inaddition, the grouping of functions within a unit, module, block, orstep is for ease of description. Specific functions or steps can bemoved from one unit, module, or block without departing from theinvention.

The various illustrative logical blocks, units, steps and modulesdescribed in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein can beimplemented or performed with a processor, such as a general purposeprocessor, a multi-core processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), anapplication specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmablegate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate ortransistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combinationthereof designed to perform the functions described herein. Ageneral-purpose processor can be a microprocessor, but in thealternative, the processor can be any processor, controller,microcontroller, or state machine. A processor can also be implementedas a combination of computing devices, for example, a combination of aDSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or moremicroprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other suchconfiguration.

The steps of a method or algorithm and the processes of a block ormodule described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein canbe embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by aprocessor, or in a combination of the two. A software module can residein RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory,registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form ofstorage medium. An exemplary storage medium can be coupled to theprocessor such that the processor can read information from, and writeinformation to, the storage medium. In the alternative, the storagemedium can be integral to the processor. The processor and the storagemedium can reside in an ASIC. Additionally, device, blocks, or modulesthat are described as coupled may be coupled via intermediary device,blocks, or modules. Similarly, a first device may be described atransmitting data to (or receiving from) a second device when there areintermediary devices that couple the first and second device and alsowhen the first device is unaware of the ultimate destination of thedata.

The above description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enableany person skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Variousmodifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to thoseskilled in the art, and the generic principles described herein can beapplied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scopeof the invention. Thus, it is to be understood that the description anddrawings presented herein represent a presently preferred embodiment ofthe invention and are therefore representative of the subject matterthat is broadly contemplated by the present invention. It is furtherunderstood that the scope of the present invention fully encompassesother embodiments that may become obvious to those skilled in the art.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising, by at least one hardwareprocessor: receiving, from each of a plurality of parties, an offloadingdemand for future access to an alternative network; receiving, from eachof a plurality of providers of access to the alternative network, areserve price for access to a plurality of access points in thealternative network that are provided by the provider; for reservationswithin a short-term future time span, allocating and pricingreservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism; forreservations within a long-term future time span that is further in thefuture than the short-term future time span, allocating and pricingreservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using core-selecting combinatorial auctions; and, foreach reservation, at the time of that reservation, offloading one ormore mobile devices, that are communicatively connected to a primarynetwork of the party to which that reservation was allocated, from theprimary network to the reserved access point of the alternative network.2. The method of claim 1, wherein allocating and pricing reservations ofthe plurality of access points, provided by the plurality of providers,to the plurality of parties by solving the mixed integer program usingthe VCG mechanism comprises: computing a first solution to the mixedinteger program for all of the plurality of parties; for each winningparty in the solution, allocating a reservation won by that winningparty to that winning party, and computing a second solution to themixed integer program for all of the plurality of parties except thatwinning party; and calculating a price, to each winning party for eachreservation won by that winning party, as a difference between a valueof the second solution, which excludes that winning party, to all of theplurality of parties except that winning party and a value of the firstsolution to all of the plurality of parties except that winning party.3. The method of claim 2, wherein allocating and pricing reservations ofthe plurality of access points, provided by the plurality of providers,to the plurality of parties by solving a mixed integer program usingcore-selecting combinatorial auctions comprises executing aprice-finding algorithm that minimizes a Euclidean distance between acore payment vector and a VCG payment vector, wherein the core paymentvector comprises a set of prices for winning parties, such that nolosing party would be willing to pay more for a reservation than what awinning party would pay, and wherein the VCG payment vector comprisesthe prices for each winning party calculated using the VCG mechanism. 4.The method of claim 3, wherein allocating and pricing reservations ofthe plurality of access points, provided by the plurality of providers,to the plurality of parties by solving a mixed integer program usingcore-selecting combinatorial auctions further comprises iterativelyadding new core constraints to the price-finding algorithm until no coreconstraints are violated.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein theshort-term future time span is one day long.
 6. The method of claim 1,wherein the reserve price, received from each of the plurality ofproviders, is a minimum price that must be met on average across all ofthe plurality of access points in the alternative network that areprovided by that provider.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein, from eachof the plurality of providers, a reserve price is received for each ofthe plurality of access points in the alternative network that areprovided by that provider.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the primarynetwork is a wireless cellular network.
 9. The method of claim 8,wherein the alternative access network is a Wi-Fi network.
 10. Themethod of claim 8, wherein each offloading demand indicates a cellularsector and a time slot, and wherein each reservation is for an accesspoint within the cellular sector and during the time slot included in atleast one offloading demand.
 11. The method of claim 10, wherein theplurality of parties comprise one or more of a mobile network operatorand a mobile virtual network operator.
 12. The method of claim 11,wherein the mixed integer program for the reservations in one or both ofthe short-term future time span and the long-term future time spancomprises:${\max{\sum\limits_{i \in I}{\sum\limits_{j \in J}{V_{ij} \cdot \frac{\sum\limits_{k \in K}Y_{ijk}}{D_{ij}}}}}} + {\sum\limits_{i \in I^{\prime}}{\sum\limits_{j \in J}{\sum\limits_{k \in K}{V_{i}^{\prime} \cdot Y_{ijk}}}}}$wherein i ε I represents a set that includes each mobile networkoperator, wherein i ε I′ represents a set that includes each mobilevirtual network operator, wherein j ε J represents a set that includeseach cellular sector, wherein k ε K represents a set that includes eachtime slot, wherein V_(ij) represents a value to a mobile networkoperator i for offloading all demand in a cellular sector j to thealternative network, wherein V_(i)′, represents a per-unit value to amobile virtual network operator i for offloading data to the alternativenetwork, wherein Y_(ijk), represents a reservation to a mobile networkoperator i or mobile virtual network operator i for a sector j duringtime slot k, and wherein D_(ij) represents an offloading demand from amobile network operator i in a cellular sector.
 13. A system comprising:at least one hardware processor; and one or more software modules that,when executed by the at least one hardware processor, receive, from eachof a plurality of parties, an offloading demand for future access to analternative network, receive, from each of a plurality of providers ofaccess to the alternative network, a reserve price for access to aplurality of access points in the alternative network that are providedby the provider, for reservations within a short-term future time span,allocate and price reservations of the plurality of access points,provided by the plurality of providers, to the plurality of parties bysolving a mixed integer program using a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)mechanism, for reservations within a long-term future time span that isfurther in the future than the short-term future time span, allocate andprice reservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using core-selecting combinatorial auctions, and, foreach reservation, at the time of that reservation, offload one or moremobile devices, that are communicatively connected to a primary networkof the party to which that reservation was allocated, from the primarynetwork to the reserved access point of the alternative network.
 14. Thesystem of claim 13, wherein allocating and pricing reservations of theplurality of access points, provided by the plurality of providers, tothe plurality of parties by solving the mixed integer program using theVCG mechanism comprises: computing a first solution to the mixed integerprogram for all of the plurality of parties; for each winning party inthe solution, allocating a reservation won by that winning party to thatwinning party, and computing a second solution to the mixed integerprogram for all of the plurality of parties except that winning party;and calculating a price, to each winning party for each reservation wonby that winning party, as a difference between a value of the secondsolution, which excludes that winning party, to all of the plurality ofparties except that winning party and a value of the first solution toall of the plurality of parties except that winning party.
 15. Thesystem of claim 14, wherein allocating and pricing reservations of theplurality of access points, provided by the plurality of providers, tothe plurality of parties by solving a mixed integer program usingcore-selecting combinatorial auctions comprises executing aprice-finding algorithm that minimizes a Euclidean distance between acore payment vector and a VCG payment vector, wherein the core paymentvector comprises a set of prices for winning parties, such that nolosing party would be willing to pay more for a reservation than what awinning party would pay, and wherein the VCG payment vector comprisesthe prices for each winning party calculated using the VCG mechanism.16. The system of claim 15, wherein allocating and pricing reservationsof the plurality of access points, provided by the plurality ofproviders, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixed integerprogram using core-selecting combinatorial auctions further comprisesiteratively adding new core constraints to the price-finding algorithmuntil no core constraints are violated.
 17. A non-transitorycomputer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by aprocessor, cause the processor to: receive, from each of a plurality ofparties, an offloading demand for future access to an alternativenetwork; receive, from each of a plurality of providers of access to thealternative network, a reserve price for access to a plurality of accesspoints in the alternative network that are provided by the provider; forreservations within a short-term future time span, allocate and pricereservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism; forreservations within a long-term future time span that is further in thefuture than the short-term future time span, allocate and pricereservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using core-selecting combinatorial auctions; and, foreach reservation, at the time of that reservation, offload one or moremobile devices, that are communicatively connected to a primary networkof the party to which that reservation was allocated, from the primarynetwork to the reserved access point of the alternative network.
 18. Thenon-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17, wherein allocatingand pricing reservations of the plurality of access points, provided bythe plurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving themixed integer program using the VCG mechanism comprises: computing afirst solution to the mixed integer program for all of the plurality ofparties; for each winning party in the solution, allocating areservation won by that winning party to that winning party, andcomputing a second solution to the mixed integer program for all of theplurality of parties except that winning party; and calculating a price,to each winning party for each reservation won by that winning party, asa difference between a value of the second solution, which excludes thatwinning party, to all of the plurality of parties except that winningparty and a value of the first solution to all of the plurality ofparties except that winning party.
 19. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 18, wherein allocating and pricingreservations of the plurality of access points, provided by theplurality of providers, to the plurality of parties by solving a mixedinteger program using core-selecting combinatorial auctions comprisesexecuting a price-finding algorithm that minimizes a Euclidean distancebetween a core payment vector and a VCG payment vector, wherein the corepayment vector comprises a set of prices for winning parties, such thatno losing party would be willing to pay more for a reservation than whata winning party would pay, and wherein the VCG payment vector comprisesthe prices for each winning party calculated using the VCG mechanism.20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19, whereinallocating and pricing reservations of the plurality of access points,provided by the plurality of providers, to the plurality of parties bysolving a mixed integer program using core-selecting combinatorialauctions further comprises iteratively adding new core constraints tothe price-finding algorithm until no core constraints are violated.